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Abstract
We investigate how asymmetric information on nal demand a¤ects
strategic interaction between a downstream monopolist and a set of up-
stream monopolists, who independently produce complementary inputs.
We study an intrinsic private common agency game in which each sup-
plier i independently proposes a pricing schedule contract to the assem-
bler, specifying the suppliers payment as a function of the assemblers
purchase of input i. We provide a necessary and su¢ cient equilibrium
condition. A lot of equilibria satisfy this condition but there is a unique
Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium from the supplierspoint of view.
In this equilibrium there are unavoidable e¢ ciency losses due to exces-
sively low sales of the good. However, suppliers may be able to limit
these distortions by implicitly coordinating on an equilibrium with a rigid
(positive) output in bad demand circumstances.
JEL-Classication: D82, L10, L14, L22.
Keywords: complementary inputs, asymmetric information, private com-
mon agency games.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates how asymmetric information on nal demand a¤ects
strategic interaction when a set of upstream monopoly rms independently
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provide complementary inputs to the better informed downstream monopolist
(complementary monopolies framework1). In particular, we identify unavoid-
able e¢ ciency losses generated by excessive cumulative input rates 2 and we
analyze whether input suppliers are able to mitigate these problems.
These questions are not new but they are now more crucial than they were
at the time when Cournot (1838) wrote the Chapter IX of his Recherches sur les
Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses on the "mutual relations
of producers". Whereas Cournot considered copper and zinc suppliers selling
to competitive producers of brass, modern examples include a wide range of
situations, like for instance: Microsoft and Intel selling respectively chip and
operative system to computer makers (HP, Lenovo, Dell..); Boeing buying jet
engines to General Electric and avionics to Honeywell. Indeed, as products be-
come more and more sophisticated, input complementarities also become more
pervasive. For example, in the biotech industry, modern vaccines incorporate
numerous inputs with corresponding third-party proprietary rights attached. In
the aviation industry, Laussel (2008) refers that Airbus has no less than 15.000
suppliers among which 600 suppliers are providing parts of planes equipment.
Lemley and Shapiro (2006) or Gerardin et al. (2008) refer that modern smart-
phones incorporate thousands of inputs, whose licenses are held by a fairly large
number of rms.3
Over two centuries, the economics literature has identied two sources of
ine¢ ciency arising within complementary monopolies set-ups: (i) coordination
failures among input suppliers and, (ii) double marginalization. First, as follows
from the seminal work of Cournot (1838), the fact that input suppliers set their
prices independently (without accounting for the impact of such decisions on
other suppliers) leads to ine¢ ciently low output production. Second, as long
as upstream rms exert some degree of bargaining power, they do not account
for the e¤ect of their pricing decisions on the downstream rmsprots, leading
to the well-known double marginalization problem (Spengler, 1950). The two
e¤ects result in price (output) levels which are greater (smaller) than the ones
which would follow from joint prot maximization.
While in a complete information set-up, the adoption of sophisticated pric-
ing strategies (e.g non-linear pricing strategies like two-part tari¤s)is able to
eliminate the two distortions described above4 , we conclude that it is no longer
1 In this set-up, rms interactions are not only horizontal (between suppliers) but also
vertical (between the suppliers and the downstream rm(s)), so that the term "complementary
monopolies" has to be taken in a broad sense.
2For example, at the European level, there have been a lively debate on the consequences
of excessive cumulative input rates. For example, this issue is at the heart at the debates on
"fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND)" terms to remunerate patent holders.
3For example, according to Geradin et al. (2008) for the European version of 3G, WCDMA,
if we consider patents from all jurisdictions, there were 7.000 essential patents declared to the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (in 2004). The authors also re¤er that
these patents were held by many di¤erent rms.
4First, it is well known that the equilibrium "marginal price" of the non-linear pricing
strategy is equal to the marginal cost, eliminating the double marginalization issues (see,
e.g. Tirole, 1988). Second, non-linear pricing also rules out coordination issues among input
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the case when the downstream rm is better informed about demand than input
suppliers. Intuitively, if the suppliers used truthful strategies which are optimal
in the full information case, the assembler would misreport (underestimate) the
consumerswillingness to pay for the good in order to reduce the payments
due to the suppliers. Thus, under asymmetric information, non-linear pricing
strategies are no more able to restore joint prot maximization of the vertical
chain (in an attempt to reduce the assemblers informational rent, each supplier
ends up setting an excessively high price for its input).
Some rst insights on the answers to these questions may be drawn from
a general paper by Martimort and Stole (2009a) on private common agency
games.5 The authors model competition in non-linear price schedules between
two rms (the principals), each selling one good to a privately informed con-
sumer (the agent) with the two goods ranging from perfect complements to
perfect substitutes. Their model may be alternatively interpreted as a game
between two upstream rms and a informed downstream monopolist and, in
the perfect complements case, this boils down to our own complementary mo-
nopolies model. The authors show that the equilibrium sales level is smaller
than the one which would maximize the suppliersjoint prots. However, they
only look at the di¤erentiable equilibrium6 , whereas we nd that, at least in the
perfect complements case, this is only one among a lot of possible equilibria.
More precisely, we consider a game in which each input supplier indepen-
dently o¤ers to the assembler a non-linear pricing schedule which species the
payment required for any given quantity of purchased input. Then, the assem-
bler observes the true demand, deciding whether he accepts or rejects all the
suppliersproposals. Formally, the game we analyze here is an intrinsic private
common agency game. 7
In line with the common agency theory, we look for the Nash equilibrium of
the intrinsic private common agency game describe above. We nd a necessary
and su¢ cient condition for the assemblers equilibrium sales function (which
suppliers, as shown by the seminal works of Bernheim and Whinston (1986a and 1986b), who
conclude that, at the truthful equilibria of common agency games, the aggregate prots of the
vertical structure are maximized. All these strategies obey the same simple principle: they
make the downstream rm (the "Agent") the residual claimant with respect to the upstream
rm(s) (the "Principal(s)")
5Common agency is a formal setting in which several "Principals" choose in a rst stage
transfer schedules intended to inuence second stage actions of an "Agent". Many standard
IO models are in fact common agency models with restricted sets of transfer schedules (such as
linear or two-part tari¤s). Two papers by Bernheim and Whinston have pioneered the formal
study of common agency games: Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) in the case of complete
information and Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) in the case of Agents private information.
Applications to IO include Monteiro and Page (1998, 2008).
6The only equilibrium they characterize in this context is the di¤erentiable one without
any bunching, except at the zero outputs levels (in their framework, this has to do with partial
market coverage rather than with true bunching).
7 It is intrinsic because the assembler either contracts with all suppliers or with none of
them due to the perfect complementarity of inputs. It is private since each principal (supplier)
i0s contract is conditional only on the privately observed purchases of input i by the agent
(the assembler), thus excluding, under free disposal, the possibility of contracting payments
on the level of downstream sales as well as the levels of purchases of the other inputs.
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denes equilibrium sales as a function of the realized value of the demand pa-
rameter). This condition is twofold. First, it implies a ceiling on the sales level,
which is below the level that maximizes the suppliersaggregate expected prots
(leading to unavoidable e¢ ciency losses). Second, it includes a sub-condition,
which denes a set of admissible sales functions. The latter are such that either
(i) the equilibrium sales level increases with the demand unknown parameter
or (ii) it is constant over an interval (bunching) of demand realizations. While
the second sub-condition is not new for public common agency screening games
(see, in particular, Martimort et al. 2016 and Martimort and Stole, 2015), it is a
new result in for private common agency games. Moreover, in our case, we need
to impose an original restriction on the set of equilibrium sales functions (the
salesceiling referred earlier) so that not all the sales functions satisfying the
condition in Martimort et al. (2016) constitute an equilibrium in the present
paper.
Nonetheless, this paper shows that a lot of equilibria satisfy our necessary
and su¢ cient condition, including regular (di¤erentiable), semi-regular equilib-
ria, constant, step-function equilibria, hybrid equilibria. However, those equilib-
ria are not all equivalent from the supplierspoint of view. We show that there
is a unique Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is such
that, in the best demand states, sales are strictly increasing with the demand
intercept: In the worst demand circumstances, two cases may arise: (i) when
the extent of ex-ante demand uncertainty is large, the market is not covered,
(ii) when the range of possible demand realizations is su¢ ciently narrow, sup-
pliers prefer to have a rigid (and strictly positive) level of sales, mitigating the
underprovision ine¢ ciencies associated with the assemblers informational rent.
Although in the last case, there is less exibility to adjust sales to the demand
circumstances, suppliers benet from selecting the most favorable equilibrium
contract (as if they were implicitly coordinating on a strictly positive output
level).
The possibility of bunching at the bottom arising in our set-up also looks
like an extension to an incomplete information framework of the type of equilib-
rium with xed output (in the negotiation phase) proposed by Spulber (2016) to
restore allocative e¢ ciency in an upstream-downstream framework with com-
plementary monopolies.8 Indeed, our equilibrium output level tends in the
limit towards a constant one when the ex-ante uncertainty on demand vanishes.
However, di¤erently from Spulber (2016), in our case, the e¢ ciency losses are
unavoidable since the constant output level remains too low to maximize the
joint prots of the vertical structure.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the baseline
model. In Section 3, we analyze the assemblers decisions, in Section 4 the
suppliersoptimization problems. In Section 5, we characterize the equilibrium
sales functions. In Section 6 we review the possible equilibria, identifying which
equilibria are Pareto dominated from the suppliers perspective. Finally, in
8More precisely, Spulber (2016) nds out that joint prot maximization can be achieved
under strategic interaction among multiple sequential decisions, involving quantities of various
inputs (in the rst stage) as well as prices (in the second stage).
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Section 7, we conclude. All the missing proofs are presented in Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a downstream monopoly rm (the "assembler") that manufactures/
assembles a good from n complementary parts. The latter are supplied by n
independent upstream rms (the "subcontractors" or "suppliers"). We assume
perfect complementarity among components, meaning that one unit of the good
requires one unit of each component part. The set of suppliers is denoted by
N . The assemblers and the suppliers constant marginal costs are normalized
to zero.9
For the sake of simplicity, the goods nal demand is supposed to be linear,
with:
D(P ) =    P , P =   Q; (1)
where  stands for consumerswillingness to pay for the nal product, P stands
for the price in the downstream market and Q 2 [0; qmax] represents the sales
in the downstream market (i.e. the assemblers output). The value of  is
assumed to be private information of the assembler.10 Each subcontractor has
the same prior on ; represented by a cumulative distribution function F (:) and
a strictly positive density function f everywhere on [; ]. We make the classical
assumption that the inverse hazard rate, h() = 1 F ()f() ; is non-increasing in
: This assumption is satised by all the usual distributions (e.g. uniform,
exponential, normal, binomial, Poisson..).
Assumption 1: h0()  0:
We analyze here a two-stage game between the assembler and the suppliers.
In the rst stage, each of the n subcontractors independently o¤ers a upper-
hemi-continuous tari¤ (pricing schedule) Ti : [0; qmax] ! R; i.e. each supplier
promises to supply qi 2 [0; qmax] units of input i to the assembler in exchange
of a payment11 Ti(qi): This o¤er is chosen to maximize its own expected prot.
Then, in the second stage, the assembler learns the realized value of  and,
given the tari¤s Ti(:) proposed by the n suppliers, it accepts or rejects all the
subcontractorsproposals. If it rejects them, it does not produce and it earns
zero prots. If it accepts them, it chooses, after learning the realized value of ;
9To avoid any loss of generality, we simply suppose that, when indi¤erent between two
supply levels of imput i, a supplier always selects the smallest one. An innitesimal cost of
production is indeed enough to break a possible indi¤erence.
10 Informational issues of this sort are quite common in decentralized supply chains (e.g.
Özer and Wei, 2006 or Oh and Özer, 2006). For example, Özer and Wei (2006) argue that "the
manufacturer often has better demand information because of her proximity to consumers".
It is also worth noting that the model could be easily changed to accomodate asymmetric
information about costs instead of demand.
11Throughout the text we will use the terms tari¤ s, payments and pricing schedules inter-
changeably.
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to produce the output level Q and to buy the quantities of input qi (i = 1; 2; ::; n)
which maximize its prots.
The IO problem we are looking at here is formally a common agency game in
which the suppliers (the Principals) simultaneously and independently attempt
to inuence the assemblers (Agents) second-period choice of input and output
levels. This inuence is exerted through the decision on the pricing schedules
which are only restricted here to be upper hemi-continuous. Actually, the stan-
dard model in which the suppliers rst choose the prices of the inputs and the
downstream monopolist then xes its price or output level is nothing else than
a common agency model in which the pricing schedules are constrained to be
linear.
The common agency game studied in this paper has two key features. It is
an intrinsic common agency game because the assembler either contracts with
all suppliers or with none of them and it is private since each principal contracts
on a di¤erent observed variable chosen by the downstream rm. It di¤ers from
a public common agency game where each principal would o¤er a contract in
which the supplierspayments would all depend on the same variable, such as a
"royalty contract" in which all payments depend on the downstream rms nal
sales. We implicitly assume here that the sales level is not publicly observable or
not contractible or both. Hence, as currently observed in practice, the contract
between the downstream rm and each supplier i species payments which are
only conditional on the quantity of input i which is bought by the assembler to
supplier i, not on the amount of input actually used12 .
Let q = fq1; q2; :::; qng be the vector of input levels. Assumption 2 below
states that the assembler must buy at least the quantities of input required to
produce the intended output level but he is free to buy greater quantities. When
doing so, it does not bear any storage or disposal costs.
Assumption 2 (Free disposal): The set of admissible inputs and output
levels is
 = fQ 2 [0; qmax];q 2 [0; qmax]n : Q  qi; i = 1; 2; ::; ng:
Let now T = fT 1 (:); T 2 (:); :::; T n(:)g be the array of equilibrium tari¤s
functions and T i the array of equilibrium tari¤ functions of suppliers other
than i. In line with standard common agency theory, we will focus our attention
on the pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium, whose formal denition is
presented below:
Denition 1 An equilibrium of this game is an array of equilibrium tari¤ func-
tions T, an equilibrium output function Q() = Q(;T) and an array of equi-
librium input functions q() = (q1 () ; :::; qn ()) = q(;T); such that, for any
i = 1; 2; :::; n:
12The latter assumption would be equivalent to a contract based on the sales level.
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(i)
fQ(;T i; Ti);q(;T i; Ti)g 2 arg maxfQ;qg2
24(  Q)Q  nX
j=1;j 6=i
T j (qj)  Ti(qi)
35 ;
(ii)
T i (:) 2 argmax
Ti(:)
E[Ti(qi(;T

 i; Ti)]
subject to

 
;Q(;T i; Ti);q(;T

 i; Ti);T

 i; Tig
  0;8 2 ;  ;
where (:) denotes the assemblers prot.
Part (i) of Denition 1 states that, given the realized value of  and the
pricing schedules previously selected by the n suppliers, the assembler chooses,
in the second stage of the game, the sales and input levels which maximize its
prot.
Part (ii) in Denition 1 implies that each supplier i chooses, in the rst stage
of the game, the pricing schedule which maximizes its expected prot given the
pricing schedules of the n   1 other suppliers, subject to the (participation)
constraint that the assemblers prot should not be negative for any realization
of . Then, at this stage of the game, there is a Nash equilibrium in pricing
schedules between the n suppliers.
In the standard Principal-Agent model, one usually uses the Mirrlees (1971)
trick13 to have the Principal choose the Agents action which maximizes its own
prot for each possible value of  and implement it via a contract T instead
of selecting directly the optimal contract T . Martimort and Stole (2009a) have
shown that, under pricing schedules, the same trick may be used despite the
existence of several suppliers: each individual supplier behaves as would a mo-
nopolist supplier facing a downstream rm, i.e. each supplier maximizes with
respect to qi an indirect prot function (qi; ); which depends only on qi, 
and the pricing schedules of the other suppliers:14 More precisely, the indirect
prot function (qi; ) is dened as
(qi; ) = max
Q; q i
(  Q)Q 
nX
j=1;j 6=i
Tj(qj); (2a)
s:t: Q  qj ; 8j = 1; 2; ::; n; (2b)
where q i 2 [0; qmax]n 1 is the vector of input quantities of the other suppliers
besides supplier i. It is important to notice that the inuence of qi on the
13The trick is to use in the Agents problem the Envelope Theorem to eliminate the transfer
function (pricing schedule) from the Principals expected payo¤.
14From Lemma 2 in Section 4, the regularity condition dened by Martimort and Stole
((2009a), Denition 1, pages 85-86) holds here in equilibrium.
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agents (assemblers) indirect prot comes here from the constraint on the sales
level. Indeed, we dene
fQ(qi; );q i(qi; ))g = argmax
Q;q i
(  Q)Q 
nX
j=1;j 6=i
Tj(qj); (3a)
s:t: Q  qj ; j = 1; 2; :; i; ::; n; (3b)
so that the functions Q(qi; ) and q i(qi; )) show respectively how the sales
level and the quantities of inputs bought to other suppliers j 6= i depend on the
quantity of input qi:
We may equivalently write the indirect utility function as
(qi; ) = (  Q(qi; ))Q(qi; ) 
nX
j=1;j 6=i
Tj(q

j (qi; )):
This will be useful when we shall come to supplier i0s optimization problem.
After making use of Mirrlees (1971) trick, this problem will indeed amount to
determine the equilibrium input function qi() which maximizes i0s expected
prot.
3 Assemblers Decisions
In the second stage of the game, upon accepting the supplierso¤ers, the as-
sembler chooses the quantity Q of output to sell to nal customers and the
quantities of inputs qj (j = 1; 2; ::; n) to buy, which, given the the n suppliers
contracts, maximize its prots for the realized value  of the demand shock.
fQ();q())g = argmax
Q;q
(  Q)Q 
nX
j=1
Tj(qj); (4a)
s:t: Q  qj ; j = 1; 2; :; i; ::; n: (4b)
Remark that the equilibrium sales level can never be greater than the level

2 which would maximize the assemblers prot if it could buy the n inputs at
zero marginal prices. Otherwise, deviating toward sales equal to 2 would be
feasible, allowing the assembler to obtain greater gross prots, while paying (at
most) the same global price for the inputs.15
Let A() denote the maximum of the assemblers prot with respect to Q
and q16 ; given the n supplierscontracts (as specied in equation (5) below).
In order to prepare the way for the analysis of the supplier is optimization
problem, let
15Free disposal allows the downstream rm to buy greater quantities of inputs than strictly
needed for production when that allows it to pay a smaller global price.
16A more precise notation would be A(; fT1(:); T2(:); :::; Tn(:)g):
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bqi() = argmax
qi
(qi; )  Ti(qi):
Straightforwardly
qi() = bqi()
and
A() = max
qi
(qi; )  Ti(qi) (5)
Moreover Q(qi(); ) = Q() and q i(qi(); )) = q i(): The Lemma below
is standard but important since it shows that the Envelope Theorem applies to
the assemblers prot function, which constitutes an essential step for using
afterwards the Mirrlees trick to solve the suppliersproblems.
Lemma 1 (a) Q is non decreasing and thus almost everywhere di¤erentiable
in ;
(b) A is continuous in  and @
A()
@ = Q() = Q
(qi(); )  0:
From Lemma 1 we know that the assembler earns its lowest prot in the
worst market conditions (i.e. when the realized value of the market size pa-
rameter equals ). Moreover, in the second stage, the assemblers minimum
possible prot from contracting with the subcontractors should not be nega-
tive, otherwise it would prefer not to produce. Consequently, condition (iii) in
Denition 1, i.e. the assemblers participation constraint (i.e. the individual
rationality condition for the downstream rm) amounts to
A()  0: (6)
Note also that the absolute continuity of A implies that we can now write
A() as
A() = A() +
Z 

Q(s)ds; (7)
where the term A() represents equilibrium prot in the worst market cir-
cumstances ( = ): The second term results from the assemblers incentive
compatibility constraints, which guarantee the assemblers incentives to reveal
the true value of ; and is an informational rent: From (7) follows that, for a
realized value of ; the assemblers rent is an increasing function of Q(): In
other words, when the assembler produces more in the bad circumstances there
is a larger benet to the assembler in good circumstances. This is because the
assemblers incentive to misreport a small demand realization is stronger the
greater is Q(0): in order to ensure truthful reporting this has to be counterbal-
anced by a smaller aggregate input price.
In light of the denition of A(), we nd that expression (7) is equivalent
to the following necessary condition that the sum of supplierspayments must
satisfy for fQ();q()g to maximize the assemblers prot:
nX
j=1
Tj(qj()) = [  Q()]Q() A() 
Z 

Q(s))ds: (8)
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This condition follows from the Envelope Theorem and it will allow us to
eliminate the supplier is price schedule from i0s expected prot. Hence, we can
now move to the study of the suppliersoptimization problems.
4 SuppliersOptimization Problems
In the rst stage, supplier i s equilibrium tari¤ should maximize its expected
prot (corresponding to the expected payments received from the assembler in
exchange of the purchase of quantities qi() of input i):Z 

Ti(qi())f()d; 8i 2 N;
subject to the assemblers incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
Regarding the latter, recall that, in equilibrium, in the worst demand circum-
stances ( = ); we must have A() = 0; since otherwise any supplier could
reach a larger expected prot by demanding a larger payment from the as-
sembler, without violating its participation constraint. This follows from the
fact that we are considering a model with complementary upstream monopolies
and therefore the assembler either accepts all the contracts or rejects them all
(choosing not to produce in the last case).
Using now the famous Mirrlees (1971) trick, i.e. substituting for Ti(qi())
its value from equation (8), the equilibrium input function qi() must maximize
the expected prot of each supplier
qi() 2 argmax
qi
Z 


(  Q(qi(); ))Q(qi(); )
 Pnj=1;i 6=j Tj(qj (qi(); ))) A ()

f()d; (9)
subject to the assemblers incentive compatibility constraint (7) and the partic-
ipation constraint (6).17
Expression (9) implies that, for each ; supplier is prot equals the aggregate
prot of the vertical structure minus the assemblers payments to the other
suppliers and the assemblers informational rent.
Notice that, contrary to what happens in the one principal - one agent
model, the expected prot of principal i still depends on the tari¤s of the other
principals. It is also important to remark that a supplier i cannot directly
inuence the sales level (nor the quantities purchased of the other inputs) since,
under the free disposal assumption, the tari¤ Ti does not depend on them but
only on its supply of input i: This makes a substantial di¤erence with the public
common agency game in which contracts ("royalty" ones) depend directly on
the level of sales of the downstream rm. The indirect inuence of qi on Q and
q i is described by (3a) in Section 2.
17The quantity of input purchased is decided by the assembler. However, each supplier i
chooses a contract which induces (if implementable) the assembler to select for each  the
quantity qi which is optimal from its point of view, allowing us to make use of the Mirrlees
trick.
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Integrating by parts supplier is maximand and accounting for (7), we obtain
the equivalent condition that qi() should maximize i(qi; ), corresponding to
supplier i0s adjusted prot. Formally:
qi() 2 argmax
qi
i(qi; ); (10)
where
i(qi; ) = (   h() Q(qi(); ))Q(qi(); ) 
nX
j=1;i 6=j
Tj(q

j (qi(); ))):
Indeed, in order to estimate the benets from a given output level Q con-
ditional on ; the supplier must subtract from its direct prot the term h()Q;
since h() is the marginal increase in the assemblers informational rent, result-
ing, from a marginal increase of Q at : As already explained, for  > 0; the
assemblers incentives to misreport consumerswillingness to pay for the nal
good (the unknown demand parameter ) are larger the larger is Q () : Accord-
ingly, maintaining a truthful reporting of  by the assembler requires supplier i
to reduce its nancial demands.
Given our characterization of i(qi; ); we can now dene Si (); correspond-
ing to the maximum of suppliers i indirect adjusted prot as follows:
Si () = max
qi
i(qi; ) (11)
and we shall check later that the unconstrained solution of this problem satis-
es the assemblers incentive compatibility constraint derived in Lemma 1, i.e.
@Q()
@  0:
We are now in position to prove a very useful result: at equilibrium the
assembler is induced to buy only the quantities of inputs which are necessary
to manufacture the equilibrium output level corresponding to the amount of
its nal sales. The intuition is that supplier is preferred sales level is never
greater than the sales level which would maximize the assemblers prot absent
any constraint on the quantity of input i18 : by selecting a supply of input i
equal to its preferred sales level, supplier i induces the assembler to select the
latter.
Lemma 2 At equilibrium qi() = Q(); 8i = 1; 2; ::; n:
Remark 1 The equilibrium sales level Q() is never greater than  h()2 ; 8 2
; 

such that  h()2  0:
The above remark points toward an important di¤erence with the public
common agency game where the payments are conditional on the sales level.
In the latter model, contrary to the present one, equilibrium sales levels above
18Or equivalently if the input i was supplied for free.
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 h()
2 may constitute an equilibrium due to decreasing tari¤s: smaller levels of
sales may be "punished" by requiring greater payments to suppliers j 6= i19 , dis-
suading a joint deviation towards them by supplier i and the assembler. Under
free disposal, it is no more possible to "punish" small out-of-equilibrium sales
levels by requiring greater payments since the assembler always buys greater
input quantities than required for production if this allows it to pay a smaller
price to suppliers20 , so that a joint deviation by a supplier i and the assembler
is protable.
Corollary 1 At equilibrium,
(i)
Q() = argmax
Q
(   h() Q)Q 
nX
j=1;i 6=j
Tj(Q);
Si () = max
Q
i(Q; ) = (   h() Q)Q 
nX
j=1;i 6=j
Tj(Q):
(ii) Condition (8) becomes
nX
j=1
Tj(Q()) = [  Q()]Q() A() 
Z 

Q(s))ds: (12)
Lemma 3 below shows that the Envelope Theorem applies both to (i) each
suppliers adjusted prot function and to (ii) the assemblers prot function.
Lemma 3 Si () is absolutely continuous in ; a.e. di¤erentiable and
@Si ()
@ =
[1  h0()]Q(); 8i 2 N:
Given the absolute continuity of Si (); we now obtain
Si () = 
S
i () +
Z 

([1  h0(s)]Q(s))ds; (13)
and hence it follows that, if Q() is an equilibrium sales function which max-
imizes supplier is expected prots, then the tari¤ functions of all principals
j 6= i must satisfy (14):Pn
i=1;j 6=i
Ti(Q()) = [   h() Q()]Q() R 

(1  h0(s))Q(s)ds Si () :
(14)
19We do not mean that such a "punishment" is intentional but that there exist extensions of
the other pricipals tari¤ schedules outside the equilibrium range of output which may sustain
(i.e. implement) high output levels.
20Notice that the same argument was used to show that the assembler never chooses a sales
level greater than 
2
: However the restriction imposed by suppliersbehavior is stricter.
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Notice that in order to obtain this condition, we have applied nothing else
than Mirrlees trick to the principal is problem (11): we use the Envelope
Theorem to obtain a condition which the aggregate transfer function of all
other principals j 6= i must satisfy if Principal i is to (indirectly) select a sales
function Q():21
There are n such conditions (one for each supplier i). Now, summing up over
these n conditions, we obtain the following necessary condition on the aggregate
transfer function of all principals:
(n  1)Pn
i=1
Ti(Q()) = (15)
n
h
[   h() Q()]Q()  R 

((1  h0(s))Q(s))ds
i
 Pni=1 Si () :
In light of this result, we are now able to study the properties of equilibrium
sales functions.
5 Equilibrium Sales Functions
When applying the Envelope Theorem to the assembler and to the suppliers
payo¤ functions, we obtained respectively conditions (14) and (15) Taken to-
gether, these conditions allow us to eliminate the pricing schedules and to derive
a condition which an equilibrium sales function (dening equilibrium sales for
di¤erent realizations of the demand parameter) must necessarily satisfy. This
condition is based on the concept of virtual aggregate prot22 of the vertical
structure, which can be formally dened as follows:
Denition 2 The virtual aggregate prot of the vertical structure, V (Q; s); is
dened as:
V (Q; s) = [s  nh(s) Q]Q; (16)
with the partial derivative Vs(Q; s) = (1  nh0(s))Q:
Proposition 1 A non-decreasing function Q(); is an equilibrium sales func-
tion if and only if, for 8 2 ;  ;
(i)
Q()     h()
2
; 8 2 ;  such that    h()
2
 0; (17)
(ii) Z 

Vs(Q(s); s)ds = V (Q(); )  V (Q(); ): (18)
21The Mirrlees trick was initially applied to the agents problem.
22Martimort and Stole(2016) speak instead of "surrogate surplus" since in their framework
an output function is an equilibrium one i¤ it is a point-wise maximizer of the surplus of the
"surrogate principal". This condition remains necessary but it is no more su¢ cient here.
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Proposition 1 above fully characterizes the set of equilibrium sales functions
and, given Lemma 2, it also characterizes the set of equilibrium input functions
of our model. Any such function Q(), the array of input functions q() where
qi() = Q(); i = 1; 2; ::; n; and any n tuple of tari¤s which implements them
in the assemblers and the n suppliersoptimization problems23 constitute an
equilibrium of the game following Denition 1.
Condition (18) is close to the general characterization obtained by Marti-
mort, Semenov and Stole (2016) for public intrinsic common agency games,
which amounts mutatis mutandis to state that the equilibrium allocation (here
the sales function) is a pointwise maximizer of the virtual surplus24 . More pre-
cisely, a sales function is an equilibrium one only if a ctitious agent, with payo¤
function V (Q(b); ) would truthfully report the value of : An equilibrium sales
function is necessarily an incentive-compatible one for this ctitious problem.
Formally:
 = argmaxb V (Q(b); ): (19)
This incidentally answers the question: what does the vertical structure
maximize? This is of course a reminiscent of Slade (1994) who found in the
oligopoly case "necessary and su¢ cient conditions for Nash equilibria of static
and state-space games to be observationally equivalent to single optimization
problems".
While in the public intrinsic common agency game studied by Martimort,
Semenov and Stole (2016), condition (18) is necessary and su¢ cient, in the case
of our (specic) private intrinsic common agency game, it is only necessary.25
Indeed, the private nature of our common agency game together with our free
disposal assumption leads to the additional condition (17), absent in MSS, that,
for each ; equilibrium sales are bounded above by the critical value  h()2 .
The necessity of (17) was shown in Remark 1. The necessity of (18) is es-
tablished from (12) and (15) in an original way, i.e. by generalizing Mirrlees
Trick to a common agency framework. We apply it rst as usual to the Agents
problem but then as well, by use again the Envelope Theorem, to each of the
Principals problems in order to nally eliminate the transfer functions. To prove
the su¢ ciency of (17) and (18), we show that if these two conditions hold, there
23We show in the proof of Proposition 1 that such tari¤s always exist under conditions (17)
and (18). They are not unique since they have to dene payments also for quantities outside
the equilibrium range.
24Basically that means that an equilibrium sales function must satisfy V (Q(); ) 
V (Q(0); ); for all  and 0 2
h
; 
i
:
25Moreover, our proof of the common part of the equilibrium conditions is di¤erent and may
have an interest in itself, outside the context in which it is obtained. What we do is basically
to generalize MirrleesTrick to a common agency framework by applying it rst as usual to
the Agents problem but then as well, by using again the Envelope Theorem, to each of the
Principals problems in order to nally eliminate the transfer functions and then obtain an
equilibrium condition. This methodology was already applied in Laussel and Palfrey (2002)
to characterize the equilibria of a Bayesian common agency game.
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exist price schedules which implement the equilibrium sales and input functions
both in the assemblers and in each suppliers problems.
Corollary 2 below shows that Q() is non-decreasing as assumed before: over
any given interval where it is di¤erentiable, either it is constant (bunching) or
equal to a exible sales level
QD() =
1
2
(   nh()):
Note that QD () is weakly increasing in , since h0()  0; by Assumption 1.
The "maximal output level"26 which maximizes for a given  the virtual
aggregate prot of the vertical structure subject to the only constraint Q 2
[0; qmax], is Qmax() = maxf0; QD()g:
Corollary 2 For  2 [; ] an equilibrium output function Q() is, at any point
 of di¤erentiability (almost everywhere), either such that Q0() = 0 or such
that the output level is equal to QD () ; dened above. Given Assumption 1;
Q() is non-decreasing in :
We are now able to prove an intermediate result27 which will be very useful
in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 4 The virtual aggregate prot function V (Q(); ) is continuous w.r.t.
 over

; 

:
The previous results show that, at equilibrium, the virtual aggregate prot
is a continuous non-decreasing function of the private information parameter 
(monotonicity follows from the Envelope Theorem) More importantly, for any
value of this parameter, equilibrium output either is increasing and it maximizes
the virtual aggregate prot or it is constant over an interval (bunching). More-
over, there must be bunching both at the right and at the left of any point of
discontinuity of the equilibrium sales function.
A lot of equilibria do satisfy the conditions in Proposition 1. In the following
Section, we present a systematic characterization of the possible equilibrium
congurations. We start with continuous equilibria, in which the equilibrium
sales are a continuous function of : Later on, we address discontinuous equilib-
ria.
Even before looking at the equilibria congurations, it is worth noting that
a close examination of the virtual surplus function (16) _ of which the equi-
librium output function is a pointwise maximizer according to (19) _ and of
the "maximal output function" _ which maximizes the virtual surplus function
over the whole range [0; qmax] _ already suggests that ine¢ ciencies are going
to exist at equilibrium and to be the more severe the greater is the number of
suppliers.
26 It corresponds to the "maximal equilibrium" in Martimort, Semenov and Stole (2016).
27 see MSS (2016), Proposition 2, for the same result in the case of a general public common
agency game.
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Each supplier, when designing its pricing schedule knows from the assem-
blers incentive compatibility constraints that larger output levels for "bad" real-
ized values of the demand parameter result in larger prots left to the assembler
for better demand realizations. Accounting for this e¤ect, the equilibrium pric-
ing schedules are not truthful, inducing the choice of output levels below the
optimal ones (except for the "best" realized value of the demand parameter).
Moreover this ine¢ ciency is all the more severe as the number of suppliers is it-
self greater. Each supplier when trying to reduce the informational rents left to
the assembler designs pricing schedules which overvalue the marginal cost which
they incur from input production and, at the same time, signals to the other
suppliers that it would ask more money for any output increase, reducing even
more the other suppliersdesired sales level. Thus, uncoordinated attempts to
reduce the assemblers rents result in cumulative ine¢ ciencies.
6 Equilibria characterization
6.1 Continuous Equilibria
The simplest continuous equilibrium is the constant equilibrium sales one.
This is an equilibrium such that the equilibrium sales are constant over

; 

; i.e.
Q () = Q0, 8 2

; 

: The equilibrium sales function in a constant equilibrium
is (trivially) continuous. Any positive output Q0   h()2 obviously satises
the conditions (17) and (18) of Proposition 1.
These equilibria are like bootstrap ones: each supplier selects the constant
output level because the other ones do it as well. They are implementable via
simple pricing schedules such that T (Q) = Q0( Q0); 8Q  Q0 and T (Q) very
large for all Q > Q0: When the n suppliers select this type of pricing schedule,
the assembler has no better choice that Q() = Q0 for all . Similarly, a supplier
i cannot do better than choosing Q() = Q0 when the n   1 other ones select
this type of pricing schedule.
From (7), it is easy to compute the assemblers prot conditional on 
A() = Q0(   );
and its expected prot is E[A()] = (E[]  )Q0:
The expected true aggregate prot of the vertical structure equals
E[(  Q0)Q0] = E[]Q0  Q20:
Hence, the ex-ante expected aggregate prot of suppliers,
Pn
i=1E

Si

; is
nX
i=1
E

Si

= E[]Q0  Q20   (E[]  )Q0
= (  Q0)Q0:
Since Q0   h()2 ; the ex-ante aggregate prot of suppliers are positive.
Maximizing
Pn
i=1E

Si

with respect to Q0; it is easy to see that the best
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constant equilibrium sales level from the supplierspoint of view is such that
Q0 =
 h()
2 and
Pn
i=1E

Si

= 
2 h()2
4 : A greater sales level (for instance
equal to 2 ), which would potentially yield greater aggregate prots to suppliers,
cannot be implemented under free disposal. An individual supplier would indeed
benet from deviating to a smaller sales level (for instance  h()2 ) unless the
other suppliers impose a punishment on the assembler for buying quantities of
input smaller than 2 : Such a punishment is impossible under free disposal since
the assembler would optimally choose to purchase input quantities 2 while using
smaller ones  h()2 :
The next continuous equilibrium we analyze is the continuously di¤er-
entiable (or regular) equilibrium. In this case, the corresponding sales
function is given by QD() and equilibrium sales are strictly increasing in ;
meaning that output is larger in better states of demand, as represented in the
following Figure:
Fig.1 - Regular equilibrium
Notice that QD() =  nh()2   h()2 ; 8 2

; 

:
An obvious necessary condition for the existence of a regular equilibrium
is that the equilibrium exible output QD() must be non-negative for all  2
; 

, i.e. that the market is covered: Given that, by Assumption 1,    nh()
is non-decreasing in ; this amounts to the condition    nh()  0: As the
number of independent suppliers increases, this condition becomes more di¢ cult
to satisfy. For instance, in the case of an uniform distribution, it requires that
  nn+1: So its natural to consider as well semi-regular equilibria.
Semi-regular equilibria are continuous equilibria in which the equilibrium
sales are: (i) constant over some interval and (ii) given by QD() over some
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other intervals, as in the following Figures.
Fig.2 - Semi- regular equilibrium (I)
Fig.3 - Semi- regular equilibrium (II)
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Fig.4 - Semi- regular equilibrium (III)
The continuity of the semi-regular equilibrium functions wrt  together with
the results in Corollary 2 imply that only three types of semi-regular equilibria
are possible. The rst type is such that Q() = Q1   h()2 ; 8 2 [; x]
and Q() = QD(); 8 2 x;  : The second one is such that Q() = QD();
8 2 [; x] ; and Q() = Q1; 8 2

x; 

: The third one is such that Q() = Q1 
 h()
2 ; 8 2 [; x1], Q() = QD(); 8 2 [x1; x2] and Q() = Q2; 8 2

x2; 

:
Among semi-regular equilibrium, the maximal equilibrium has attracted much
attention. We now present below a natural example of the maximal equilibrium
when there is a uniform distribution of  between 0 and 1:
Example 1 When  is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] ; any maximal equilib-
rium is the following type I- semi-regular equilibrium which satises:
(i) Q() = 0 for all  2 [0; nn+1 ];
(ii) Q() = (n+1) n2 for all  2
h
n
n+1 ; 1
i
;
(iii)
Pn
i=1 Ti(Q) =
n(Q Q2)
n+1 ; 8Q 2

0; 12

:
Such an equilibrium is supported by many extensions of the contracts outside
the equilibrium sales range (i.e. for Q > 12), for instance Ti(Q) =
Q Q2
n+1 or the
constant Ti(Q) = 14(n+1) :
The second result in Example 1 shows that the equilibrium level of nal sales
is a decreasing function of n for  2 [0; 1] : The coordination failure is, as usual,
all the more severe as the number of suppliers increases. The third result is
specially interesting. First it shows that the marginal input price is larger than
the marginal cost. Second, it shows that, for any positive sales level, the input
price paid by the assembler to each supplier is decreasing with the number of
subcontractors. This is of course a reminiscent of the similar result obtained
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in a model where subcontractors compete in linear prices, following from the
strategic complementary in the suppliersprices (see Laussel, 2008).
Remark 2 In the context of Example 1, we obtain that the ex-ante expected
prot of the assembler, E

A

; is equal to
E

A

=
1
12(n+ 1)2
; (20)
whereas, the expected prot of subcontractor i; denoted E

Si

; is
E

Si

=
1
6(n+ 1)2
: (21)
Interestingly, the values given by equations (20) and (21) are exactly identical
to those obtained in a model with no uncertainty ( = 1 with probability 1),
independent upstream rms only and linear prices (see Laussel, 2008).
6.2 Discontinuous Equilibria
A n step-function equilibrium is an equilibrium in which ;  is divided in
n+1 intervals [xj ; xj+1) such that Q() = Qj , 8 2 [xj ; xj+1]; with Qj+1 > Qj ;
x0 =  and xn+1 = : From Proposition 1, Qj+1  xj h(xj)2 ; 8j. In an n-step-
function equilibrium, with n > 0, the equilibrium sales function is discontinuous.
More precisely, in an n-step equilibrium, the equilibrium sales function shows
a number n of upward jumps as the parameter  increases from  to  and the
level of sales is constant over each interval. The following Figure illustrates the
equilibrium output function in the case of a 1 step-function equilibrium.
Fig.5 - 1-step function equilibrium
Corollary 3 From Lemma 4, an n step equilibrium is such that at each point
xi; i  1; i  n; the condition V (Qi 1; xi) = V (Qi; xi) must hold or, equiva-
lently, xi   nh(xi) = Qi 1 +Qi: Since the function   nh() is increasing in 
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and it takes its maximum  at  = ; it follows that all successive output pairs
must satisfy the su¢ cient condition Qi 1 +Qi  : I
A hybrid equilibrium is a discontinuous equilibrium such that

; 

is
divided in n + 1 (a nite number) intervals [xj ; xj+1), so that (i) there is at
least one interval over which Q() takes a constant value, (ii) there is at least
one interval over which Q() = QD() (iii) there is at least one xj such that
lim
"xj
Q() < lim
#xj
Q(): Put otherwise, a hybrid equilibrium is a mix of a step-
function and a regular (or semi-regular) equilibrium. Given the continuity re-
sults in Lemma 4, there cannot be a discontinuity between a strictly increasing
segment and a constant segment of the equilibrium output function. The fol-
lowing Figure illustrates one possible case of a hybrid output equilibrium (the
conditions Qj+1  xj h(xj)2 ; 8j; need to hold):
Fig.6 - Hybrid equilibrium
6.3 Equilibria Selection
The previous analysis shows that there are a large number of equilibria as long
as there are more than one supplier. When n > 1; as we argued in the con-
stant equilibrium sales case, the suppliers may implicitly coordinate on a lot of
di¤erent equilibria by choosing the corresponding pricing schedules. Hence, we
investigate here the equilibria which are Pareto-dominated from the suppliers
point of view. The rst steps will be to show that semi-regular equilibria of type
(II) and type (III) and discontinuous equilibria are indeed Pareto-dominated (see
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 below, respectively) allowing us to restrict our attention
to regular equilibria and semi-regular equilibria of type (I).
At this point, it is worthwhile to derive simple expressions for the expected
aggregate suppliersprots E[S ].
Remark 3 The equilibrium expected aggregate suppliersprots is
E[S ] = E [(   h() Q())Q()] ; (22)
or, equivalently,
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E[S ] = V (Q(); ) +
Z 

Q() [(n  1)  n(1  h0())F ()] d: (23)
From (22), the expected aggregate suppliersprot equals the expected vir-
tual surplus in the case n = 1, i.e. when there is only one supplier. The
intuition is that, would all suppliers act cooperatively, they would maximize
joint expected prots, which are equal to the expected virtual surplus for n = 1;
as a result of equation (9).
Lemma 5 below shows that from the supplierspoint of view, a constant level
of sales QD (x) over (x; ] is ine¢ ciently low. The optimal output level from the
supplierspoint of view is indeed given by the value of QD() when n = 1, i.e.
1
2 (   h()): Replacing QD (x) for each  2 (x; ] by the greater, though still
sub-optimal, exible sales levelQD () unambiguously raises suppliersaggregate
prots.28
Lemma 5 Let us consider x 2 ;  : For any arbitrary sales function  () ;
an equilibrium such that the sales function is given by  () ; 8 2 [; x]; and
QD (x) ; 8  2 (x; ]; is Pareto dominated by an equilibrium such that the sales
function is given by  () ; 8  2 [; x]; and QD () ; 8 2 (x; ]:
It is also possible to show that hybrid equilibria are Pareto dominated be-
cause, over the discontinuity range [x0; x1], it is always better to switch to a
exible sales level QD() rather than to stick to the two constant output levels
QD (x0) and QD (x1). To this end, for any arbitrary sales function  () ; let us
consider an equilibrium sales function QH () such that
QH () =
8>><>>:
 () if    < x0;
QD (x0) if x0   < x;
QD (x1) if x   < x1;
 () if x1   < ;
(24)
with  < x0 < x < x1 < :
Lemma 6 shows that such step-wise function is Pareto dominated by a sales
function QC () which is identical to QH () except for the fact that it is con-
tinuous between between x0 and x1
QC () =
8<:
 () if    < x0;
QD () if x0   < x1;
 () if x1   < :
(25)
The following gure illustrates the behavior of QH () in the solid line and
QC () ; in the dashed line (note that the two coincide when    < x0 or
x1   < ).
28Note that such equilibria are also Pareto-dominated from the assemblers point of view
since they lead to lower expected prot than the one associated with the production of QD () :
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Fig.7 - QC () (in dash) vs QH () (solid line)
In order to prove that all hybrid equilibria are Pareto-dominated by equilib-
ria regularized in the way described by (25), we now introduce a new condition
on the distribution of types29 .
Assumption 3: For almost all  2 ;  ;
(1  nh0())(1  h0())  (n  1)h()h"(): (26)
Assumption 3, which means that the hazard rate should not be too convex, is
identical, mutatis mutandis,30 to Assumption 2 (page 19) in MSS (2016).31 To
derive it, they use Amador and Bagwell (2013) results on optimal delegation. In
their framework, it is a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a oor equilibrium
in a public common agency game. We use it in Lemma 6 below to rule out
any discontinuous equilibrium.32 The proof is much simpler than the one from
Amador and Bagwell (2013). The purpose of Assumption 3 is also more intuitive
in the present framework.
Lemma 6 Under Assumptions 1 and 3, an equilibrium such that the sales func-
tion is given by QH () dened in (24) is Pareto dominated by an equilibrium
such that the sales function is given by QC() in (25).
Lemma 6 implies that all discontinuous equilibria are Pareto dominated.
Given Lemmas 5 and 6, a exible sales function QD () Pareto-dominates all
other equilibrium sales functions except possibly for bad realizations of the
29 In the rst version of this paper (Laussel and Resende (2016)), the result was proved
assuming an uniform distribution of types.
30 In MSS the private information parameter is a cost parameter so that there is no distortion
at the bottom (it exists at the top). Accordingly the relevant inverse hazard rate is F ()=f():
31They claim that it is satised by the uniform, exponential, Laplace, Pareto, Weibull and
Chi-square distributions.
32 It can be shown that this rules out discountinous equilibria in our private common agency
game as well as in a public common agency game in royalty contracts.
23
demand parameter. Accordingly, in what follows, we shall only consider either
(i) regular equilibria, with
QR () = QD () ; 8 2 ;  ; (27)
or (ii) semi-regular equilibria in which the equilibrium sales function is increas-
ing for the highest values of  (being constant for low    values);
QSR () =
(
QD

SR

if     SR;
QD () if SR <   :
(28)
We now need to study how these equilibria are Pareto-ranked from the point
of view of the suppliers. To do so, notice that, from a formal point of view, a
regular equilibrium is simply a semi-regular equilibrium, with SR = . Hence,
ranking the equilibria in (27) and (28) amounts to determine the value of SR,or
equivalently, the corresponding level of sales QD

SR

; which constitutes the
minimum equilibrium sales level that maximizes the suppliersexpected aggre-
gate prot.
Given Assumption 1, the function QD() is invertible. Let then  = QD 1:
Proposition 2 (i) Su¢ ciency:
If Assumptions 1 and 3 hold, the best, Pareto-undominated, Nash equilibrium
sales function is dened by (28) and
QD(SR) = maxf   h()
2
; 0g; (29)
or, equivalently,
SR = maxf(   h()
2
);(0)g: (30)
(ii) Necessity:
The best, Pareto-undominated, Nash equilibrium sales function is dened by
(28) and (29) only if (26) holds for almost all  2 [maxf(  h()2 );(0)g; ]:
The necessity part of Proposition 2 is completely original. The intuition
is the following: if there exists some sub-interval in the range of values of 
where the sales level is given by QD() (the regular part of the equilibrium
sales function) and over which (26) does not hold, it is clear from the proof
of Lemma 6 that one could always construct a (discontinuous) deviation over
this sub-interval which would satisfy Proposition 1 and Pareto-dominate the
equilibrium considered in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 implies that a bunching occurs optimally in bad circumstances.
The best equilibrium from the supplierspoint of view is (i) either the maximal
equilibrium in which the market is not served when the consumerswillingness
to pay for the good is small (bunching at the zero output level) or (ii) an
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output oor equilibrium in which the sales level is a positive constant for bad
realizations of the demand parameter (bunching at a oor output level). The
former (resp. latter) case obtains when  is small (resp. great) enough so that
   h() < 0 (resp.    h() > 0). Put otherwise, the maximal equilibrium is
Pareto-optimal i¤ the range of realized values of the demand parameter is large
enough.
Example 2 In the uniform distribution case:
(i) QD(SR) = 0 and SR = nn+1 when   2;
(ii) QD(SR) = 2 2 and 
SR = 2+(n 1)n+1 when   2:
The sales level at which bunching occurs is a result of a trade-o¤ between
two opposite forces.33 On one hand, a regular sales function allows a exible
adjustment of the level of sales to the circumstances. On the other one, it
implies an ine¢ ciently low level of sales, especially in bad circumstances. The
exibility argument has little bearing when the ex-ante uncertainty on  is small
and bunching (at a positive level) always occurs (the interval over which it occurs
being an increasing function of the number of suppliers). Moreover, when the
number of suppliers tends to innity, the oor equilibrium implies a constant
equilibrium output in all circumstances.
When ex-ante uncertainty is large; bunching at a positive level never occurs
though it would be all the more protable as the number of suppliers increases.
The key of this apparent paradox is again free disposal: suppliers would collec-
tively benet from a oor sales level but under free disposal there is no way to
dissuade each of them to individually deviate towards a smaller level of input
sales.35
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates how asymmetric information on nal demand a¤ects
strategic interaction between the assembler and a set of upstream monopoly
rms, who independently provide complementary inputs to the better informed
33Notice that the condition dening the oor equilibrium output level in the public common
agency game34 Z b

(   h()  2QD(b))f()d = 0: (31)
Of course a positivity constraint has to be checked in addition, i.e. QD(b)  0: Consider
the case where it holds true. It is easy to check (see for instance the Proof of Proposition 2)
that b > (  h()
2
) or, equivalently, QD(b) >  h()
2
: Clearly the oor equilibrium dened
by (31) does not satisfy the condition (i) in Proposition 1. The intuitive reason is that the
implementation of such a oor output level would require payments decreasing with the sales
level over some interval.
35Other suppliers would have to punish smaller sales levels but no such punisments are
available when it is possible to pay for a given input quantity and to use a smaller one.
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assembler. To this end, we propose an intrinsic private common agency game.
In the rst stage, each of the suppliers maximizes its own expected prot by
independently proposing a payment contract (price schedule) to the assembler.
In the second stage, the assembler learns the realized value of the uncertain
demand parameter, choosing whether to accept or reject all the subcontractors
proposals.
We are able to derive a condition which a sales function satises if and only
if it is an equilibrium one. We nd that this necessary and su¢ cient equilibrium
condition depends on the virtual aggregate prot of the vertical structure (which
is always smaller than the true aggregate prot for any number of suppliers larger
than one) and it also implies a ceiling on the sales level in each circumstance.
This allows us to make the point that, in a set-up with asymmetric information,
coordination failures always lead to some e¢ ciency losses, even when upstream
rms rely on non-linear pricing schemes.
We also nd that a lot of equilibria satisfy the necessary and su¢ cient
equilibrium condition, including regular (di¤erentiable), semi-regular, constant,
step-function and hybrid equilibria. However these equilibria are not all equiv-
alent from the point of view of suppliers. In this respect, we nd that there is a
unique Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, for the best
demand states, sales are increasing with the unknown demand parameter. How-
ever, for the worst demand circumstances, two situations are possible, depending
on the extent of ex-ante demand asymmetry. When the latter is important, we
nd that the market is not covered in the worst demand states. In other words,
a severe form of ine¢ ciency arises in these circumstances. Di¤erently, when the
domain of admissible values of the demand parameter is small enough, suppliers
can mitigate (without eliminating) the underprovision problem. More precisely,
they can implicitly coordinate on an equilibrium with a rigid (and strictly pos-
itive) output in bad circumstances (above the regular one). In other words,
ine¢ ciency does not preclude full market coverage in this case. However, it re-
mains a problem in the sense that the level of the nal sales remains excessively
low.
Our results on pricing schedules can be compared with Martimort and Stole
(2009a), who also deal with pricing schedules in private common agency games,
not necessarily restricted to perfectly complementary inputs. In particular,
when the domain of admissible values of the demand parameter is not too wide,
we nd that suppliers have incentives to implicitly coordinate on a semi-regular
equilibrium with bunching at the bottom. This possibility was not analyzed by
Martimort and Stole (2009a) since they exclusively studied di¤erentiable equi-
libria. We show that, by coordinating on this equilibrium, suppliers mitigate
(without completing eliminating, though) some ine¢ ciency losses resulting from
the interplay of asymmetric information and suppliersnon-cooperative behav-
ior. While this is not new for public common agency games (see Martimort,
Semenov and Stole (2016)), this is a new result in a private common agency
game.
At a more substantial level, our paper conrms and extends Spulbers (2016)
results on complementary monopolies to a context with private information. In
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our model bunching at the bottom arises when ex-ante uncertainty is small
enough and allows to partially restore e¢ ciency. In the limit, when uncertainty
vanishes, we obtain exactly Spulbers result: the equilibrium output level tends
toward the constant output level that maximizes aggregate suppliersprots.
Finally notice that the perfect complementarity case which we study here is
quite specic in that it allows to characterize all the possible equilibria of the
game. When the inputs are imperfect complements, it is impossible to fully
eliminate the pricing schedules when trying to characterize the equilibria of the
game36 since we need to account for the degree of inputs complementarity, as
well as for the relationship between the nal downstream sales and each input
levels (for each supplier and its rivals as well).37
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
(a) suppose that 0 > ; from revealed preference it must be that
(  Q())Q() 
nX
i=1
Ti(qi())  (  Q(0))Q(0) 
nX
i=1
Ti(qi(
0))
and
(0  Q(0))Q(0) 
nX
i=1
Ti(qi(
0))  (0  Q())Q() 
nX
i=1
Ti(qi());
implying
 
   0 (Q ()) Q  0)  0.
(b) A is convex as a supremum of convex (linear here) functions. It is
also continuous at the endpoints of the domain

; 

. It is hence absolutely
continuous38 in : Suppose that 0 > ; from the above "revealed preference
inequalities we obtain
 
0   Q  0  A(0)   A()   0   Q ()), so
that, dividing throughout by
 
0    and letting 0 tend toward , we obtain
@A()
@ = Q()  0:
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose on the contrary that Q(qi(); ) < qi(); where qi() is dened by
(10), i.e. maximizes supplier is adjusted prot.
Let fQA();qA i()g be solution of the assemblers problem (3a) in which
the constraint Q  qi has been deleted. Since, at the solution of (3a), this
constraint does not bind, Q(qi(); ) = QA() and q i(qi(); ) = q
A
 i() do
36This is the very reason why Martimort and Stole (2009a) only characterize the "maximal
equilibria".
37When the inputs are imperfect complements, how close they are, the relationships between
the sales level Q an the rivals input levels qj ; j 6= i; on one hand, and the supply qi of input
i; on the other, necessarily involve the derivatives of the rivalspricing schedules.
38Continuity is implied by convexity only at the interior points of the domain: see Roberts
and Varberg (1973), pp. 9-10. We thank one referee for indicating us this reference.
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not depend on qi and the corresponding suppliers adjusted prot equals
 
  QA()  h()QA()  nX
j=1;j 6=i
Tj(q
A
j ()): (32)
Let us on the other hand consider the solution to the problem of maximizing
supplier is adjusted prot when i is able to select directly Q() and q i() :
fQS();qS i()g = argmax
Q;q i
(  Q  h())Q 
nX
j=1;j 6=i
Tj(qj); (33)
s:t: Q  qj ; 8j 6= i:
From revealed preferences, 
  QA()QA() Pnj=1;j 6=i Tj(qAj ())  
  QS()QS() Pnj=1;j 6=i Tj(qSj ());
and  
   h() QS()QS() Pnj=1;j 6=i Tj(qSj ())  
   h() QA()QA() Pnj=1;j 6=i Tj(qAj ()):
implying h()(QA() QS())  0, QS()  QA() = Q(qi(); ) < qi():
Let us show that the supplier i may reach a greater prot than (32) simply
by choosing to sell a quantity of input i equal to QS() instead of the quantity
qi():
This is obviously the case when the solution Q(QS(); ) of the assemblers
problem (3a) under the constraint Q  QS() is such that Q(QS(); ) =
QS()39 : Let us show that it must indeed be the case thatQ(QS(); ) = QS().
Suppose on the contrary that the solution of the assemblers problem (3a) under
the constraint Q  QS() implies a sales level Q0() < QS(): It must then be
that
(  Q0())Q0() Pnj=1;j 6=i Tj(qj(Q0(); )) > 
  QS()QS() Pnj=1;j 6=i Tj(qj(QS(); )):
But, since h()  0 and Q0() < QS(); were this true, it should be that
(   h() Q0())Q0() Pnj=1;j 6=i Tj(qj(Q0(); )) > 
   h() QS()QS() Pnj=1;j 6=i Tj(qj(QS(); ));
39 In the case when QS() = QA(); equal prots obtain at qi() = QS() = QA() and
at any qi() > QS() = QA(): As indicated in Section 2, we suppose that in that case
supplier i chooses the smallest supply level (this is equivalent to assume an innitesimal cost
of producting input i).
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contradicting (33).
To conclude, supplier i is always able to induce the assembler to select the
output and input levels fQS();qS i()g by choosing to supply a quantity QS()
of input i: Then, either QS() < QA(), in which case supplier i clearly obtains
greater (adjusted) prots than at fQA();qA i()g; or QS() = QA(); in which
case an innitesimal cost of producing input i is enough to ensure that supplier
i is better o¤ when supplying a quantity of input i equal to QS(): 
Proof of Remark 1
Suppose that Q() >  h()2 > 0: Obviously qj()  Q(): Suppose now
instead that the supplier i chooses a supply level qi() =
 h()
2 : Under the
constraint Q   h()2 ; the solution Q(  h()2 ; ) of the assemblers problem
(3a) is either =  h()2 or <
 h()
2 :
1. ifQ(  h()2 ; ) =
 h()
2 , the supplier is adjusted prot is greater than the
prot obtained at Q() >  h()2 since (i) for 8Q() 6=  h()2 ; (  h()2 )2 >
(   h() Q())Q() and (ii) in order to produce a quantity of output
 h()
2 < Q(), the assembler does not need greater quantities of inputs
other than i and pays accordingly at most the same aggregate transferPn
j=1;j 6=i Tj(qj()) to suppliers j 6= i:
2. if Q(  h()2 ; ) <
 h()
2 ; then by the same argument as in Lemma 2, the
supplier is adjusted prot must be greater at Q(  h()2 ; ) than at
 h()
2
and thus strictly greater than at any Q() >  h()2 :
Proof of Lemma 3
Let  =    h(): Dene now
bi( ; q) = (  Q)Q  nX
j=1;i 6=j
Tj(Q):
and bSi () = max
q
bi( ; q):
Since bi is linear in  ; bSi () is convex in  as a supremum of convex (lin-
ear) functions, hence absolutely continuous40 (AC). By assumption 1, () is
invertible so that Si () = bSi (()) is AC and a.e. di¤erentiable.
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) Necessity
From Lemma 2, Q() = qi(); 8i = 1; 2; ::; n: Moreover from Remark 1, it
must be that Q()   h()2 : On the other hand, we already know that a non-
decreasing output function Q() (and the input functions qi() = Q()) solve
40Notice that it is continuous at the endpoints of the interval, a necessary condition for
absolute continuity (see again Roberts and Varberg (1973)).
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respectively the Assemblers Problem (4a) and the SuppliersProblems (9) only
if the payment schedules, Ti, are dened by equations (12) and (14).
Substituting in (15)
P
Ti(Q ()) for its value from (8) and rearranging we
obtain:
0 =
"
V (;Q ()) 
Z 

(1  nh0 (s))Q (s) ds
#
 
nX
i=1
si () :
Evaluating the previous condition at  = ; we obtain:
V (;Q ()) =
nX
i=1
si () :
Given that Vs(Q(s); s) = (1 nh0(s))Q(s); the result in Proposition 1 must hold.
(b) Su¢ ciency
Let us consider the implementation of a non-decreasing sales functionQ() 
 h()
2  2 when the assembler solves the associate problem maxQ 	(;Q) =
(   Q)Q   T (Q): Since the single-crossing property (CS+) is here obviously
satised41 (i.e. @
2	(;Q)
@Q@ = 1 > 0), there exists T (:) such that
 
Q(:); T (:)

is in-
centive compatible for this associate problem. Notice that condition (12) wherePn
i=1 Ti(Q()) is replaced by T (Q()) is necessary in the associate problem as
well as in the original one. From condition (12) for any 0 > ; we have:
T (Q(0))  T (Q()) =
Z 0

(s  2Q(s))Q0(s)ds;
from what we deduce that Q()   h()2  2 implies that any transfer func-
tion T which implements a non-decreasing sales function Q()   h()2 in the
associate problem must be non decreasing in Q:
Consider now in the original problem the tari¤ functions Ti(qi) = 1nT (qi),
i = 1; 2; ::; n: Let us now show that they implement the non-decreasing sales
and input functions qi() = Q()   h()2  2 ; i = 1; 2; ::; n: Suppose on the
contrary that there exist qi(
0) = q(0)  0 h(0)2 ; i = 1; 2; ::; n; which give a
strictly greater prot to the assembler, i.e.
(   eq)eq   T (q(0)) > (  Q())Q()  T (Q());
where eq 2 [0; q(0)]42 : Since T is non decreasing, it follows that
(   eq)eq   T (eq) > (  Q())Q()  T (Q());
contradicting the fact that T implements Q() in the associate problem.
41The single-crossing property implied by a strictly positive cross partial derivative is called
increasing di¤erences or supermodularity: see Topkis (1998) and Amir (2005).
42Remember that free disposal allows the assembler not to consume all the quantities of
inputs he buys.
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Using now condition (12), where
Pn
i=1 Ti(Q()) is replaced by T (Q()); to-
gether with condition (18), we obtain
n 1
n T (Q()) = [   h() Q()]Q() R 

(1  h0(s))Q(s)ds  1nV (Q(); ):
(34)
Notice that the denition of the virtual prots implies that
Pn
i=1
s
i () =
V (Q(); ): Given that the tari¤ functions are identical for all, the si () are
identical as well 8i = 1; 2; ::; n: It follows that (34) implies
n 1
n T (Q()) = [   h() Q()]Q() R 

(1  h0(s))Q(s)ds si () ; i = 1; 2; ::; n;
(35)
which is the necessary (rst-order) condition(14) for each Principal i: It remains
to verify the global second order conditions for each Principal is problem. We
can apply the same proof strategy as in the Agents case. Consider the associate
problem for Principal i : max
Q
 i(Q; ) = (  Q  h())Q   n 1n T (Q): Since
the single-crossing property (CS+) is here obviously satised (i.e. @
2 i(;Q)
@Q@ =
1   h0() > 0), not only the local second order conditions (34) are satised for
the associate problem but also the global ones.
Consider now in the original problem the tari¤ functions Tj(qj) = 1nT (qj),
j 6= i:We now show thatPj 6=i 1nT (qj) implements the non-decreasing sales and
input functions qi() = Q()   h()2  2 : Suppose on the contrary that there
exists qi(
0)  0 h(0)2 ; which gives a strictly greater prot to supplier i and
remembering that the function T is increasing, we must have
(   h()  bq)bq   n  1
n
T (bq) > (   h() Q())Q()  n  1
n
T (Q());
where bq 2 [0; qi(0)]43 : But this contradicts the optimality ofQ() for supplier
i in the corresponding associate problem. 
Proof of Corollary 2
The proof is straightforward. Indeed di¤erentiating (18) with respect to
; one obtains Vs(:) = VQQ0() + Vs(:), implying VQQ0() = 0: Given that
VQ =    nh()  2Q(); and given QD (), then VQQ0() = 0 implies
2

QD() Q()Q0() = 0;
yielding the results in the preceding Corollary.
Proof of Lemma 4
Given (16), V (Q(); ) is obviously continuous at any  where Q() is con-
tinuous. So we only have to consider the values of  at which Q () is dis-
continuous. Let e be such a point. Since from Lemma 1, the equilibrium
43Given that the tari¤ functions are non-decreasing, buying quantities qj > bq; i.e. greater
than the output (sales) level, cannot entail lower payments.
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sales function is a.e. di¤erentiable, points of discontinuity are isolated and it
is right and left continuous with lim
#eQ() = Q+(e) > lim"eQ() = Q (e): From
(18), lim
#eV (Q(); ) V (Q(); ) = V (Q+(e);e) V (Q(); ) = lim"eV (Q(); ) 
V (Q(); ) = V (Q (e);e) V (Q(); ): It follows that V (Q+(e);e) = V (Q (e);e):
Notice in addition that, since QD(e) = argmax
Q
V (Q;e); it must be that Q (e) <
QD(e) < Q+(e): 
Proof of Example 1
An equilibrium output function maximizing the virtual aggregate surplus
function has already been shown to be given by QD(), where here QD() =
(n+1) n
2 : The assemblers and subcontractor js rst-order conditions are re-
spectively over ( nn+1 ; 1] : (   2Q ()) =
Pn
i=1 T
0
i (Q()) and 2   1  2Q () =Pn
i=1;i 6=j T
0
i (Q()): Subtracting the second from the rst we obtain 1    =
T 0j(Q()): Using (ii) we can express  as a function of Q; with
 =
2Q+ n
n+ 1
;
and substitute this value for : We obtain T 0j(Q) =
1 2Q
n+1 and then integrating
with respect to Q, we obtain Tj(Q) = Kj +
Q Q2
n+1 ; 8Q 2

0; 12

, where Kj is a
constant. From the assemblers participation constraint and suppliers optimiza-
tion behavior,
Pn
j=1Kj = 0: It is easy to see that choosing Q = 0 maximizes the
assemblers prot for  2
h
0; nn+1
i
: It follows that
Pn
j=1 Tj(Q) =
n(Q Q2)
n+1 :
Proof of Remark 2
From equation (7) we obtain
A() =
Z 
n
n+1
Q()d =
[   n(1  )]2
4(1 + n)
(36)
for all  2

n
n+ 1
; 1

and A() = 0 otherwise,
so that the ex-ante expected prot of the assembler, E

A

; is equal to
E

A

=
Z 1
n
n+1
[   n(1  )]2
4(1 + n)
d =
1
12(n+ 1)2
: (37)
The prot of subcontractor i; for all  2
h
n
n+1 ; 1
i
; is easily obtained from
Ti(Q) =
Q Q2
n+1 ; by setting Q =
(n+1) n
2 ; implying:
Si () =
[2   + n(1  )] [   n(1  )]
4(n+ 1)
;
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for all  2
h
n
n+1 ; 1
i
and Si () = 0 otherwise. The expected prot of subcon-
tractor i; denoted E

Si

; is
E

Si

=
Z 1
n
n+1
(2   + n(1  ))(   n(1  ))
4(n+ 1)
d =
1
6(n+ 1)2
; (38)
yielding the results in Remark 2. 
Proof of Corollary 3
Let us write the condition (18) respectively at some  2 (xi; xi+1] and at xi :Z 

V 0s (Q(s); s)ds = V (Qi; )  V (Q(; ); (39)
and Z xi

V 0s (Q(s); s)ds = V (Q i; xi)  V (Q(; ): (40)
In the equation above, we consider that

; 

is divided in n + 1 intervals
[xj ; xj+1) such that Q() = Qj , 8 2 (xj ; xj+1]; with Qj+1 > Qj ; x0 =  and
xn+1 = :
Subtracting (40) from (39) we obtainZ 
xi
V 0s (Qi; s)ds = V (Qi; )  V (Q i; xi):
The LHS equals V (Qi; )   V (Qi; xi) so that we conclude that V (Qi 1; xi) =
V (Qi; xi):
Proof of Remark 3
(i) Let us rst derive (22). Notice rst that substituting in (14)
P
Ti(Q ())
for its value from (8), accounting for A() = 0; and rearranging we obtain an
expression which, evaluated at  = , yields
i=nX
i=1
Si () = 
S() = V (Q(); ):
Let us now consider the expected aggregate suppliersprot E[S ]: From equa-
tion (13) in the paper, and the above result, we obtain
E[S ] = V (Q(); ) + nE
"Z 

(1  h0(s))Q(s)ds
#
= V (Q(); ) + (n  1)E
"Z 

Q(s)ds
#
+ E
"Z 

(1  nh0(s))Q(s)ds
#
:
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Using now equation (7) and condition (18), it turns out that
E[S ] = E [V (Q(); ] + (n  1)E A() : (41)
Moreover, introducing in (41) E

A

= E[(  Q())Q()]   E[S ] and using
the denition of V (Q(); ); we obtain:
E[S ] = E [(   h() Q())Q()] : (42)
(ii) Let us now derive (23).
From the condition (18), we can write
[(   h() Q())Q()] = V (Q(); )) 
Z 

(1 nh0(s))Q(s)ds+(n 1)h()Q():
Integrating both sides between  and ; and then integrating the RHS by
parts, we obtain (23).
Proof of Lemma 5
Let us denote by Q1 () the rst equilibrium output function and by Q2 ()
the second equilibrium output function described in Lemma 5.
Given (42), the di¤erence E

S(Q2(); )
  E S(Q1(); ) between the
expected aggregate suppliersprots under equilibrium output functions Q2()
and Q1() equalsZ 
x
 
   h() QD ()QD () f()d  Z 
x
 
   h() QD (x)QD (x) f()d:
(43)
Since  h()2 = argmaxQ
S(Q; ) > QD() =  nh()2 > Q
D (x) ; 8 2
(x; ]; the concavity of S(Q; ) with respect to Q implies that S(QD(); ) >
S(QD(x); ); 8 2 (x; ], so that (43) is > 0:
Proof of Lemma 6
Let us consider the di¤erence between the expected aggregate suppliers
prot under the equilibrium output functions QC() and QH(), which, given
(23), is
E

S(QC(); )
  E S(QH(); ) =Z x1
x0
QD () g()d   [
Z x1
x
QD(x1)g()d +
Z x
x0
QD(x0)g()d] =Z x1
x0
QD () g()d   [QD(x1)(G(x1) G(x)) +QD(x0)(G(x) G(x0))];
where g() = (n  1)  n(1  h0())F () and G() = R 

g(s)ds:
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Now, integrating by parts,
R x1
x0
QD () g()d = QD(x1)G(x1) QD(x0)G(x0) R x1
x0
QD0()G()d; so that
E

S(QC(); )
  E S(QH(); ) =
(QD(x1) QD(x0))G(x) 
Z x1
x0
QD0()G()d =Z x1
x0
QD0()(G(x) G())d:
Let now z =  nh()2 : From Assumption 1, this is a monotone increas-
ing function so that there is an inverse function (z): On the other hand,
d = 21 nh0()dz: Remembering that Q
D0() = 12 (1  nh0()) a simple change of
variables leads to
E

S(QC(); )
  E S(QH(); ) = Z z1
z0
(G((
z0 + z1
2
)) G((z)))dz;
(44)
where zi =
xi nh(xi)
2 ; i = 0; 1 and (
z0+z1
2 ) = x
44 :
Now, the next step is to prove the concavity of G((z)) with respect to z.
It turns out that:
d2G((z))
dz2 =
2n
(1 nh0()) [ (1  nh0())(1  h0())f() + h"()(n  1)(1  F ())] =
= 2nf()(1 nh0()) [ (1  nh0())(1  h0()) + h"()(n  1)h()] :
From Assumptions 1 and 3, this is negative and accordingly G((z)) is
concave with respect to z
This is enough to show that the RHS of (44) is positive. From the concavity
of G((z)) with respect to z,
Z z0+z1
2
z0
(G((
z0 + z1
2
)) G((z)))dz  dG((
z0+z1
2 ))
dz
1
8
(z1   z0)2;
and
Z z1
z0+z1
2
(G((
z0 + z1
2
)) G((z)))dz   dG((
z0+z1
2 ))
dz
1
8
(z1   z0)2;
so that
R z1
z0
(G(( z0+z12 )) G((z)))dz  0:
44From the continuity of V (Q(); ) wrt  at a disconuity point, z = x nh(x)
2
=
1
2
Pi=1
i=0
xi nh(xi)
2
= z0+z1
2
:
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Proof of Proposition 2
Given (22) and (28), the suppliersaggregate expected prots may be written
along a semi-regular equilibrium as
Z SR

(   h() QD(SR))QD(SR)f()d +
Z 
SR
(   h() QD())QD()f()d:
Their derivative with respect to SR is easily obtained as:
1  nh0(SR)
2
Z SR

(   h()  2QD(SR))f()d:
Remember the constraint Q()   h()2 ; 8 2

; 

:
For any SR such that the previous constraint is satised, i.e. QD(SR) =
SR nh(SR)
2   h()2 ; the above derivative is strictly positive. Letting now c
be such that 
c nh(c)
2 =
 h()
2
45 ; the solution of our problem is SR = c
whenever the non-negativity of sales constraint is satised, i.e. 
c nh(c)
2 > 0:
Otherwise it has to be such that SR = (0); where (0)  nh((0)) = 0 : the
optimal sales level is zero for all  2 [;(0)] :
The necessity part of the Proposition is straightforward. Suppose that (26)
does not hold over some interval [0; 1] : Then the equilibrium sales function
which is identical to the semi-regular (or regular) one dened in Proposition
2 except that Q() = QD(0);  2 [0; x] ; and Q() = QD(1);  2 [x; 1] ;
where x  nh(x) = 0 nh(0)+1 nh(1)2 , strongly Pareto-dominates the original
one46 .
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